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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON,

Case No.

16668

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE r-TATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Alfred William Johnson, appeals from a
conviction and judgment of Burglary, a felony of the second
degree, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Alfred William Johnson, was charged
with Burglary, a felony of the second degree in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, he was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was
sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judgment
rendered below and to have the case remanded to the Third Judicial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial the victim of the offense, Mr. Ball,
testified that on returning one afternoon to his apartment
located at Snowbird Ski Resort he found the appellant inside
(T. 11).

The appellant, according to Mr. Ball, was standing or

crouching between the ouside glass doors and the bed
This witness also testified that to the best of his

(T. 11-12).
recollecti~

the apartment had been locked and secured when he left several
hours before and that an outside screen, now torn or cut, previous ly had been intact (T. 12, 17, 24).

Mr. Bal 1 stated that

his apartment was one of a number located in a section reserved
for employees of Snowbird and that all of the other apartments wer:
vacant, open and obviously undergoing remodeling (T.20-30).

Afte:

confronting the appellant, who expressed surprise and stated he
was looking for a way out of the building, Mr. Ball suggested
that they contact the manager of the apartment complex (T. 12-14,
25-26).

The appellant, still inquiring as to the way out, left t~'

·
·
t o th e wi· t nes s , "J" egged" to a car and
premises
an d , accor d ing
drove away.

(T. 14,27-28).

Mr. Ball testified that nothing was t 2

from his apartment but some of his personal effects had been dis·
turbed (T. 11, 18-19).
The state then called the arresting officer who testifiec
on direct examination that he steppe d t h e appe 11 an t a ma tter of
(T. 36
minutes after Mr. Ball had seen the appellant drive away
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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On cross-examination defense counsel attempted to elicit a
statement from the officer made by the appellant at the time of
the stop

(T. 38,30).

The trial judge refused to allow the

officer to testify about the content of this statement on the basis
that it was hearsay, and that it was self serving and did not
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule (T. 29,41-45).
The judge indicated, however, that he would allow the officer
to answer if the questions were asked by the prosecutor (T.
43,45).

The court also stated that if the defense wanted

the statement to come in then the appellant would have to
forego his constitutional privilege not to testify (T. 41,45).
Defense counsel then made a timely proffer of the expected
testimony, stipulating that the statements were voluntary and
constituted an admission by
(1. 41,45,49-50).

~he

appellant to criminal activity

Defense counsel further indicated that the

appellant who had several prior burglary convictions which the
court refused to exclude, could take the stand if the corroborative testimony of the arresting officer was allowed (T. 49-51).
At the close of the trial, defense counsel requested that an
instruction of the lesser included offense of Criminal Trespass
be given to the jury.
was taken

This request was denied and an exception

(T. 75).

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
~HE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
EXCLUDING THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS
WHICH QUALIFIED UNDER AT LEAST FIVE OF THE
EX.CE PT IONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE.

During the cross examination of the arresting police
officer, defense counsel attempted to elicit a statement that
the appellant had made at the time of his arrest (T.39).

The

substance of the statement that was attempted to be elicited
was an admission by the appellant that he had been in the room
at Snowbird, but lacked the requisite intent to connnit the burglar;
with which he was charged (T.41).

That trial court ruled

that the statement was hearsay and did not fit within any of the
exceptions to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 45).
primary basis stated by

The

the court for the ruling was that the

statement was self-serving (T.45).
The trial court was correct in ruling that the statement
was hearsay, as described in Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
This is because it was a statement made by a person other than the
witness and it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated.

However, the trial court committed error by excluding the

statement as it fit within at least five of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule.

These five exceptions include:

Rule 63 (12)(a),

statement of Physical or Mental Condition of the Dec larant; Rule
63(6) Confessions and Admissions; Rule 63(7) Admissions by Parties
contemc
Rule 63(10) DeclaratimsAgainst Interest; an d Rule 63 ( 4 ) Cb)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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aneous Statements.
POINT A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING
THE APPELLANT'S STATEMENT AS IT CONSTITUTED
A STATEMENT OF THE MENTAL CO::;/DITION OF
THE DE CLARAJ.\IT .
The appellant was initially seen by Officer
Church proceeding westbound on 9400 South Street in Salt Lake
County, a street leading directly to the Snowbird Resort
(T. 38).

The defendant was then stopped and subsequently

made an admission that he was at Snowbird but the court would
not allow the officer to testify about what the appellant
said his reason was for being at the resort.
Such statements were admissible as a statement of a
mental condition of the declarant as described in Rule 63(12) (a)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That exception to the hearsay

rule states,
Unless the judge finds it was made in bad
faith, a statement of the declarant's (a)
then existing state of mind, emotion or physical
sensation, inclduing statements of intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily
health, but not including memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed, when such
a mental or physical condition is in issue or
is relevant to prove or explain acts or conduct
of the declarant.
In State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1977) this court was
confronted with the same issue as is raised here.

In that case

the defendant took a car from an automobile dealer with the
dealer's permission; however, when he did not return the car
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that night he was charged with auto theft.

Several hours after

receiving the car the defendant had made a statement to a friend
that he had the car for a test drive.

The trial court sustained

the prosecutor's hearsay objection to this evidence and this court
held that the trial court committed error as the statement
was admissible as a statement of the declarant's state of mind.
The court found that the error was not prejudicial.

The other

Utah Case which specifically addressed the use of Rule 63(12)
(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d
1377 (Utah 1977).

In that case the court held that it was error

to admit statements of the victim of a homicide expressing her
fear of the defendant.

The court ruled that the statements

lacked probative value as they were made several days prior to the
homicide and they did not tend to prove a fact in issue.
In the case at bar the statement was made minutes after tbe
appellant had been seen in

~1r.

Ball's room at the Snowbird resort.

Such a statement was made even closer in time to the event in
question than those held to be error to exclude in State v.
SitmD.ons, supra.

The statement more accurately reflects the state

of mind of the declarant than the statement in Simmons because
in Simmons the declarant' s intent to keep the car could change,
thus resulting in the theft, where here the important question is
the intent while the

appellant was in the room.

Likewise with re:

to time and relevancy, the appellant's statement is clearly
distinguishable from the statements held to be inadmissible in
State v. Wauneka, supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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With respect to the nature of the statement, t'.le proffer was
that the appellant had stated that he was not in the room to
commit a theft (T. 45,49).

Clearly this is a description of

his state of mind, intent, plan, motive or design as specified
in Rule 63(12) (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The cha.rge of

Burglary as described in the Information in this case required
the state to prove that the appellant had the intent to commit
a theft.

Consequently, the substance of the statement was

probative of a material fact in issue, thus distinguishing this
case from the statement admitted in the Wauneka case.
The trial court ruled that the appellant's statement was
inadmissible because it was self-serving.

Although that may

be true to some extent, that is not the test for admissibility
under Rule 63(12)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The only

question under that exception to the hearsay rule is whether the
statement was made in bad faith.

The trial court did not make

any such finding, but instead equated defense counsel's attempt
to elicit the statement to being self-serving

(T.45).

There was no showing that the statement in question was made
in bad faith.

It would be probative of the intent element of the

offense of burglary ~ the only element at issue in the trial.
Finally, it was an expression of the appellant's mental condition.
Consequently, it was admissible as a statement of the declarant' s
mental condition, an exception to the hearsay rule and the trial
court committed error in excluding it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT B
THE TRIAL COURT Cm1MITTED ERRO~ BY EXCLUDUTG
THE APPELLA..~T' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CON STITUTED A CONFESSION OR ADMISSION.
The circi.nnstances surrounding the making of the statement
in question previously have been described and need not be repeated
here.

In this statement the appellant admitted that he was in

a place where he should not have been.

Such an act could have

constituted a Criminal Trespass in violation of Utah Code Ann. !76·
(1953 as amended), which is a lesser and included offense to
Burglary which was charged in the Information (See Point II, infra
Such a hearsay statement is admissible as an admission or
confession, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.

This

exception is described in Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence:
In a criminal proceeding as against the accused,
a previous statement by him relative to the offense
charged if, and only if, the judge finds that the
statement was made knowingly and voluntarily by
the accused and the circumstances under which the
statement was made were not violative of the
constitutional rights of the accused;
The type of declarations covered by this exception to the
hearsay rule are readily observable from a brief overview of the
interpretive case law.
In State in re I<DS., 578 P.2d 9

(Utah, 1978), the juvenile

defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence after he
was involved in an automobile accident with a friend.

He stated

to the arresting police officer that he was driving the automobile
but he was not under the influence of alcohol.

That statement was

held Sponsored
to beby thean
admission
even
though
itInstitute
was
partially
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the
of Museum
and Library Servicesexculpatory
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Similarly, in State v. Burr, 579 P2d 331 (Utah, 1978), the
defendant went to a Salt Lake City Police Officer and told him
that he would be willing to testify against others involved in ,
the Second Degree Felony Thefts with which he was charged if the
state would drop these charges to Class A Misdemeanors.

This

court held that such a statement constituted an admission as
described in Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
As can be seen, the statements admissible under Rule 63(6)
01

the Utah Rules of Evidence need not be full admissions or

confession to the offense charged, but may be partially exculpatory.
The statement in question here is much more exculpatory than that
given in State v. Burr, supra.

This is because in Burr the defend-

ant told police he was willing to make a deal, here the appellant admitted to his participation in a criminal offense.

The

statement here is identical in nature to the statement given in
State in re K.D.S., supra.

The statement in that case involved

an admission by the defendant to being the driver of a car involved
in an automobile accident, but he denied being intoxicated.

Here

the appellant admitted to being present in a place where he should
not have been, but denied having the intent to commit .the crime of
theft

while in the room.

With this in mind, the question of the meaning of the phrase
"as against the accused" must be addressed.

The trial court in

this case ruled that the phrase meant that the defendant could not
introduce the evidence of an admission or confession, but the state

-9-
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could do so if i t desired (T. 40-45).

Such a ruling is incon-

sistent with policies underlying the exceptions to the hearsay
rule.

It is generally recognized that hearsay evidence is

inadmissible because it lacks the factors which have traditionally been found to insure reliability found in other types of
evidence.

McCormick on Evidence 2nd Edition (1977) §245.

Certain types of hearsay evidence are admissible because these
declarations are made under circumstances or because
contents reflect strong indicia of reliability.
Hearsav Handbook,

(1975) at p.35.

their

Binder, The

Consequently, it is the

indicia of reliability, not the nature of the party that can
introduce the evidence, that is reflcted in the phrase "as against
the accused" in Rule 63 (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

phrase "as against the accused" must be interpreted to mean that
the statement would subject the declarant to some form of
criminal responsibility, "because experience teaches that it is
unlikely that he would so declareunless it were true" State v.
Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972).

Another reason for

adopting this interpretation is that to give Rule 63(6) of the
Utah Rules

of Evidence the interpretation that the trial court

thought appropriate evidence -

only the state could introduce the

would require

th2.t Rule 63 (7), of the l!tah P.ules

of Evidence which begins "As against himself a statement by a
person who is a party to the action ... ", could not be applied by
a party opponent to introduce evidence against the opposing
party.

Such an interpretation of Rule 63

(7)

of the Utah Rules of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Evidence is not reflected in the case law interpreting that
rule.

State in re KDS, supra, State v. Burr, supra.
As previously described the statement in question here

was at least as inculpatory as that in State in re KDS,
supra.

This meets the first criterion of admissibility, that the

statement be "against the accused".

As for the other requirements

there is no question that the statement was relative to the offense
charged and counsel stipulated that the declaration was given
knowingly and voluntarily under circumstances not violative of
the appellant's constitutional rights (T.49).

Consequently, the

hearsay statement was admissible as an admission or confession
which is exception to the hearsay rule as described in Rule 63(6)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the court committed error by
excluding it.
POINT C
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING
THE APPELLAl~T' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CONSTITUTED AN ADMISSION BY A PARTY.
The statement by the appellant that he was in ~1r. Ball's
room but did not intend to commit a criminal offense was admissible
as an admission by a party.

This exception tc the hearsay rule

is described in Rule 63(7) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
As against himself a statement by a person who is
a party to the action in his individual or a representative capacity and, if the lat~er! who ~as
acting in such representative capactiy in making
the statement.
The hearsay declarations which this exception covers are essentially
-11-
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the same as those covered by Rule 63 (6).

In fact this court held

that both Rules 63(6) and 63(7) of the Utah Rules of

Eviden~e

were applicable in State v. Burr, supra, and in State in re KDS,
supra.

Those cases were both described in Point B, supra, and

need not be discussed further here.

In Watters v. Querry,

588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), the court held that it was improper
to preclude the plaintiff in a civil case from eliciting from
a witness that one of the co-defendant's stated she was distressed because she felt like she was the cause of the accident
which was eventually the subject of that civil law suit.
All of these statements express either an admission of
liability in a civil case or are inculpatory in a criminal
case.

As has previously been discussed, the statements made by

the appellant in this case admit some criminal responsibility;
therefore, the statement is "as against himself" as required by
the rule.

Likewise, there is no question that the appellant is

a party to the criminal action.

The hearsay statement in this

case qualifies as an exception to the general hearsay rule and
the trial court erred in not admitting it into evidence.
POINT D
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ER..~OR BY EXCLUDING
THE APPELLAi."IT' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CONSTITUTED A DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST.
The appellant's hearsay statement qualifies as an exception
to the hearsay rule because it was a declaration against interest
This exception is described in Rule 63 (10) of the Utah Rules of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Evidence which provides in part:
(10) Declarations Against Interest. Subject to the
limitations of exception (6), a statement which
the judge finds was made by a declarant who is
unavailable as a witness and which was at the
time of the assertion so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest
or so far subjected him to civil or criminal
liability ... that under the circumstances existing
would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true.
This rule was applied in State v. Sanders, supra.

In that

case the defendant was charged with a robbery in which four
indi.viduals were involved, his defense was that persons other
than himself had committed the robbery.

One of the four per-

sons that the defendant blamed for the robbery made a statement
to an attorney that he and three others, who did not include the
defendant committed the robbery.

The declarant refused to

testify and the evidence was offered as a declaration against
interest.

It was argued that the basis for the statement being

against the declarant's interest was the disgrace he would incur
upon becoming an informant.

The trial court allowed the attorney

to testify only about the declarant's admissions that he
was involved in the robbery but not about the participation of
others.

This

was upheld on appeal becuase the indicia of trust-

worthiness of the statement was found in the fact that it was
made against the declarant's penal interest; however, the court
found that it was not against the declarant's penal interest to
name the other participants in the robbery.
There is no question in the case at
-13-

bar that the statement
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made by the appellant subjected him to criminal liability
at least to the offense of Criminal Trespass.

This meets one of

the criteria of Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
that at the time the assertion was made it was contrary for
the declarant' s criminal liability. Another criterion is that
under the circumstances the declaration IM)uld not have been
made unless the declarant believed it to be true.

The state-

ment was made a matter of minutes after leaving the resort,
under the emotional stress of the appellant's arrest.

The appel-

lant also admitted to being in Mr. Ball's room, thus corroborat·
ing his identification of the appellant.

These circumstances

provide sufficient indicia of reliability to establish the appel·
lant' s belief that the declaration was true for purposes of this
exception to the hearsay rule.
The final criterion for admissibility is that the declarant was unavailable.

The appellant in this case was unavailable

for several reasons.

First of all, the appellant, like any

criminal defendant, was protected by the privilege against self·
incrimination as provided by the Constitutions of the State of
Utah and the United States.

Rule 62(7) (a) of the Utah Rules

of Evidence includes exception of a witness on the grounds of
privilege as a situation constituting unavailability.

Further·

more, the appellant refused to testify because he would have to
answer to his prior felony convictions for burglary.

The trial

court ruled that he could not consider the admissibility of prior
-14-
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felony convictions in light of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (T.50-51).

That rule allows the trial court to

weigh the probative value of evidence against the prejudicial
effect of that evidence:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided
the judge may in his discretion exclude eviden~e
if he finds that its probative vlaue is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and
harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that
such evidence would be offered.
This ruling is clearly incorrect in light of this court's holding
in State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1980).

Because

of the prejudicial nature of these prior convictions the
appellant was forced to assert his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, thus making him unavailable.

Con-

sequently, the appellant's statement was admissible as a declaration
against interest as described in Rule 63 (10) of tt>e Utah Rules
of Evidence, and the trial court corranitted error by excluding
that evidence.
POINT E
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING
THE APPELLAJ.~T'S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT WAS A
CONTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT.
The statement given by the appellant was made a matter of
minutes after he left Mr. Ball's room,

upon being stopped by the

police, while he was under the stress and pressure of a felony arest.
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Even

though such

a statement is hearsay, it qualifies as an

exception to the hearsay rule because it is a contemporaneous
statement as described in Rule 63(4)(b) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.

That rule provides:

A statement (a) which the judge finds was made
while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition which the statement narrates,
describes or explains, or (b) which the
judge finds was made while the declarant was
under the stress of a nervous excitement
caused by such perception.
The portion of this rule which is applicable to this case is
part "(b)" which requires that the declarant still be under
the stress or nervous excitement caused by the perception.
In State v. Sanders, supra, the court found that such stress
or nervous excitement was not present when one of the co-defendants was recovering property from a snowbank which was
taken in a robbery.

The declarant made a statement to the

witness implicating himself and three others in the robbery.
Apparently, this act was done some time after the actual commission of the robbery and the trial court had found that the
stress of nervous excitement was not present.

In contrast, the

statement of the victim of a forcible sodomy and forcit>le sexual
abuse which was made a matter of minutes after the offense
occured to an adult neighbor was held to be admissible in
State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah, 1978).

The court quoted

Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash. 2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 (1969), to
describe the nature of this exception to the hearsay rule,
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The crucial question in all cases is
whether the statement was made while the
declarant was still under the influence
of the event to the extent that his statement could not be the result of fabrication
intervening actions, or the exercise of
'
choice or judgment. State v. McMillan,
supra, at 163.
The court went on to find that a child making a statement a
matter of minutes after an occurance of a sex offense would
have little likelihood of fabricating the statement.
As previously noted the statement in this case was made by
the appellant a matter of minutes after the event occurred.
Although he was an adult, the statement was made upon arrest under
the stress and nervous excitement of that sort of traumatic
event.

With respect to the time frame,

the pressure and considering

who the statement was made to, State v. Sanders, supra, is
easily distinguishable.
to those of State v.

However, the facts here are very close

~1cMillan,

supra.

This is because the state-

ment was made a very short time after the event occurred. It
was made to a person in authority, the mother of a neighbor in
acMillan and a police officer here.

It also was made while the

declarant was still unquestionably under the stress of nervous
excitement from the incident.

Consequently, the appellant's

hearsay statement was admissible as a contemporaneous statement
as described in Rule 63 (4) (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
the trial court committed error in excluding it.
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POINT F
THE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE APPELLAi.~T'S
HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE
THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT
THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD
THE EVIDENCE BEEN ADMITTED.
To gain a reversal of a verdict based on the erroneous
exclusion of evidence two things must be shown, as described in
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside,
nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon
be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion
of evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the
proponent of the evidence either made known the substance of the evidence in a form and by a method
approved by the judge, or indicated the substance of
the expected evidence by questions indicating the
desired answers, and (b) tr.e Court which passes upon
the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion
that the excluded evidence would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding.
The substance of the evidence in question was made known by way
of a proffer out of the jury's presence

(T. 44, 49).

A

lenghthy discussion on the admissibility of the evidence was
had between court and counsel prior to the trial court's ruling
(T. 41-45, 49-50).

The question was properly raised below

and the first criterionfor reversal has been fulfilled.
It must now be shown that the excluded evidence would have
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdi~t.

In· State v. Simmons, supra, where error was found, but

held to not be prejudicial, this requirement was described to
mean

that "There must be a reasonable probability there would
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have been a result more favorable to the defendant in the
absence of error" Id. at 343.

In this case the hearsay state-

ment was the only direct evidence of the appellant's intent in
entering Mr. Ball's room.

As previously described he was

precluded from testifying in his own behalf by the trial court's
ruling on the admissibility of the appellant's prior felony
convictions. Even if the appellant had testified, this evidence,
introduced from the state's witness, would have corroborated his
testimony and bolstered his credibility.

The only factual issue

in the trial was the appellant's intent in entering into the
room.

In the absence of any other direct evidence on the issue

of the appellant's intent the erroneous exclusion of this
statement creates a reasonalbe probability that he verdict would
have been different.

This is because the jury would then have

heard the appellant's explanation for his presence in the room,
other than the equivocal statement to Mr. Ball that he was
looking for a way out. The judgment of the district court should
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
POINT II
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY A..~D THE FAILURE OF THE
COURT TO SO INSTRUCT WHEN REQUESTED BY APPELLAJ.~T
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Criminal Trespass is a necessarily included offense of
Burglary; consequently the court's failure to instruct the jury
on Criminal Trespass constituted prejudicial error and the appel-19Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lant' s conviction for Burglary should be reversed and a new tria'.
granted.
The appellant requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on Criminal Trespass as a lesser included offense to
Burglary (R. 25,27).
In appellant's requested Instruction No. 7

the appellant

requested an instruction on the offense of Criminal Trespass,
a Class B Misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2)(a)
(1953 as amended).

This requested instruction provided:
INSTRUCTION NO. 7

Before you can convict the defendant, ALFRED WILLIAM
JOHNSON, of the crime of Criminal Trespass, a Class
B Misdemeanor, a lesser included offense of burglary
as charged in the Information, you must find from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every
one of the following essential elements of that
crime:
1. That on or about the 25th day of May, 1979, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant,
ALFRED WILLI&'1 JOHNSON, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in these
instructions, entered the dwelling of Richard Ball
2. That the defendant, ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON,
entered or remained unlawfully on said property; and
(a) Intended to cause annoyance or injury to any
person thereon or damage to any property thereon; or
(b) Intended to commit any crime, other than theft
or a felony; or
(c) Was reckless .as to whether his presence would
cause fear for the safety of another.
The trial court refused to submit the requested Instruction
7 on the lesser included offense of Criminal Trespass to the jurv
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and appellant took proper exception to the court's failure to
instruct on the lesser included offense 1 (T. 74, 75).
POINT A
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT
TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE
JURY IN THE INSTRUCTIONS
It has long been the law in

the State of Utah, that an

accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to the jury
his theory of the case, and that such theory when properly
requested should be given to the jury in the form of written
instructions.

State v. Stenback, 78 U.350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions
on all defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses,
when

such are properly requested by the accused.

State v.

Gillian, 23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson,
560 P. 2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial
strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions
on a lesser included offense if his theory of defense so dictates.

1. Counsel for appellant requested the Instruction in writing
and took exception to the trial court's failure to give the
request to the jury, properly preserving this issue on
.
aopeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. State v. Erickson,
563 P.Zd 750 ( Utah 1977); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977);
and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d l.~9. 405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord:
Rules of Practice in the District Courts, Rule 5.4.
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State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1977); State v.
Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v.
Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 428, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v.
Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955).

However, when the

accused as his theory of the case requests instructions on
lesser included offenses and is willing to submit his guilt
or innocence to the jury on that theory, the trial court as
a general rule is duty bound to submit these alternatives to
the trier of the fact.

State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 372, 375,

463 P.2d 811 (1970).
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in effect
in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as charged
in the Information but some lesser offense the teachings of
Gillian yet apply.

On

this point the Gillian court stated:

One of the fundamental principles to the
submission of issues to juries is that where
the parties so request they are entitled to
have instruction given on their theory of
the case; and this includes on lesser offenses
if any reasonable view of the evidence would
support such a verdict. (State v. Gillian, supra,
23 U.2d at 374).
In Gillian, this court pointed out the reasons for this
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such a
rule.

This court said it should not be the prerogative of the

trial court to direct the jury as to what degree of crime they
may find a defendant guilty or to direct them that they must
find him not guilty if they do not find him guilty of the greater
offense.

To allow this permits the court to be a judge of the

facts and to in effect direct a verdict on the lesser included
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offenses.
3.S

Such a procedure violates the historical spirit

well as letter of our system of jury trial under the Sixth

g_nd Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.

State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.

(Straup, J. concurring).
U.S.

55 (1929)

See also Beck v. Alabama,

65 LEd 2d 392 (1980).
POINT B
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY

The test most recently given to determine if one offense
is a lesser included offense of another is that found in the
recently revised Utah Criminal Code.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)

(1953 asamended) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) If constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy,
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or
an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically desigRated by a statute
as a lesser included offense.2
The process by which such a determination is made was described in

2. This statute was recently interpreted in State v. Lloyd,
.
568 P.2d 357 (Utah 1977) and its companion case, State v. Corm.sh
568 P. 2d 360 ('Jtah 1977) wherein this court held that the Utah
joyriding statute is a lesser included offense of theft of an
operable motor vehicle.
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State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23,

33 P.2d 640 (1934):

The only way this matter may be determined is by
discovering all of the elements required by the
respective sections, comparing them and by a
process of inclusion and exclusion, determine
those common and those not common, and, if the
greater offense includes all legal and factual
elements, it may safely be said that the great
includes the less, if, however, the lesser
offense requires the inclusion of some necessary
element or elements in order to cover the completed
offense, not so included in the greater
offense, then it may be safely said that the
lesser is not necessarily included in the great. (33
P.2d at 645)
The elements which must be proved to constitute the
crime of Burglary as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202
(1953 as amended) are:
(1) A person must enter or remain in a building
or portion of a building;
(2) The entry or presence is unlawful;
(3) The actor must possess the intent to
cornrnit a felony, theft or assault.
There are two distinct offenses which constitute the crime
of Criminal Trespass as described in Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended).

§76-6-206

The elements of the first type of Criminal

Trespass as defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as
amended) are:
(1) A person enters or remains on property;
(2) The entry or presence if unlawful;
(3) The actor possesses the intent to cause
annoyance, or cornrnit a crime other than a theft
or a felony or the actor is reckless as to whether
.
his presence will cause fear for the safety or another

3.
This was the character of the Criminal Trespass instruction
requested in appellant's proposed Instruction.
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The elements of the second type of Criminal Trespass are:
(1) AThpeerson enters or remains on property;
(2)
person knows his presence is unlawful·
(3) Notice against entry has been given by
'
personal communication or by a tence or
enclosure, or by posting signs.
In comparing the statutes as Hoolman advises the first
thin;; to ask is "can a Burglary be committed without commiting the offense of Criminal Trespass?"

If the answer is "no"

to commit a Burglary one must perforce commit a Criminal
:respass, then Criminal Trespass is a lesser included offense
of Burglary.

State

v. Woolman, supra, 84 U. at 35.

An important

point of note is the provision of the Criminal Trespass
Statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2) (1953 as amended), which
states:
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,
under circumstances not amounting to burglary
as defined in sections 76-6-202, 76-2-203,
76-2-204: ... [Emphasis Suppled]
The importance of this provision is that criminal trespass
requires proof of the same elements as are needed to prove the
elements of the crime of burglary.

In other words, criminal

trespass is established by proof of less than all of the
facts required to establish the commission of burglary.

4.

Obviously

This type of Criminal Trespass was not requested by appellant.
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•

the legislative intent in this series of statutes is to make
criminal trespass a lesser included offense to the burglary
statutes.

The elements of trespass and the burglary statutes
. 1 . 5 Both require one to enter or remain in a
are l.. d entica
building and both require that such entry or presence be unlawful.

The difference in the statutes is that burglary requires

a more specific intent than criminal trespass.

In State v.

Sunter, 550 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977), this court held that possessic:
of burglary tools, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended),
is not an included offense in the burglary statutes.

This

court went on to state that for an offense to be included in
the greater offense of burglary, it must be embraced with the
Jegal definition of burglary, and that the gist of the offense
of burglary is the unlawful entry into a building unlike possession of burglary tools which is a possessory offense.
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1979), the defenda:
charged with burglary raised the defense of volunatry intoxicatic·
and requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was
denied.

On appeal the defendant claimed error in the failure to

give the instruction, but this court ruled that the defendant's
lack of intent was inconsistent with a request for an instructioc

5. The legislature
placed the burglary and criminal trespass
statutes in the same part of the code, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-20 1
et. seq. (1953 as amended), and provided common definitions
for both burglary and criminal trespass in Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-201 (1953 as amended).
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on the lesser offense.

Although the court did not expressly

state that criminal trespass is an included offense to the charge
of burglary, that holding seems implicit in the court's
ruling that "the evidence (including that presented by
the defendant) establishes all of the elements of burglary
but did not establish all of the elements of criminal
trespass" Ibid at 634.
The statutory history of the burglary and trespass sections
of the Utah Criminal Code also reflect the fact that trespass
is a lesser included offense of burglary. Both provisions
are derived from the Texa~; Penal Code. 6 In Day v. State,
532 S.W. 2d 302 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that a criminal trespass offense was a lesser
included offense to its burglary statute.

The Texas Court said:

As can be seen, the first three elements of
each of the three types of burglary and
criminal trespass are virtually identical.
The fourth main element of burglary, either the
specific intent to commit or the actual cormuission
or attempted commission of a felony or theft,
depending on the type of burglary involved,
is absent from the offense of criminal trespass.
(532 S.W. 2d at 306).
In similar circumstances wherein the prosecution was for
attempted burglary, the New Yoi:kCourt of Appeals also found the

6. Jay Barney, Utah Criminal Code Outline (1973). The Texas
Code provisions are in turn taken from the Model Penal Code
Provision. See A.L.I. Model Penal Code (P.O:D. 1962) §§221.0,
221. 2
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failure of the trail court to instruct on the lesser included
offense of criminal tresspass reversible error.

In People v

Henderson, 41 NY. 2d 233, 359 N.E. 2d 1357 (1976) the court
reversing the attempted burglary conviction noted:
The test of whether a "lesser included offense"
is to be submitted is certainly not that it is
probable that the crime was actually
cormnitted or even that there is substantial
evidence to support such a view. It suffices
that it is supportable on a rational basis or,
put another way, by logical necessity. To warrant
a refusal to submit it "every possible hypothesis"
but guilt of the higher crime must be excluded,
[citations omitted], the evidence for that
purpose being required to be considered in the
light most favorable to the defendant
(People v. Battle, 22 N.Y. 2d 323, 292 N.Y.S.
2d 661, 239 N.E. 2d 535) since the jury is
free to accept or reject part or all of the
defense or prosecution's evidence [citations
omitted] .
The court's appraisal of the persuasiveness
of the evidence indicating guilt of the higher
count is irrelevant; the question simply is
whether on any reasonable view of the evidence
it is possible for the trier of the facts to acquit
the defendant on the higher count [citations
omitted] and still find him guilty on the lesser
one. And it may not be amiss to observe that,
at time, in their projection of laymen's sensitivities to facts, "juries may, on almost any ex~us~,
convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction
of a higher degree is clearly warranted" [citations
omitted]
So tested, it must be concluded that, while on
the evidence here, though Henderson did not gain
entrance to the building (hence the charge of
attempted burg1ary) and fled when surprised
by owner, the jury nevertheless could have
found an intent to commit a larceny based upon
circumstantial evidence (see Peozle v. Terr~,
43 A.D. 2d 875, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 18 ), it coul also
have found that he lacked the requisite intent at the
time he broke the window [citations omitted] . · ·
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the jury could have decided that he never intended
to corrnnit a larceny, but rather was motivated by any
one of a conceivable number of other purposes such as
for exa~pl~, an in~ent to bed down in the premises,
to obtain information, or to engage in an act
of mischeif not larcenous in nature all
purposes, incidently, only somewhat less rational
than the one the People had asked the jury to infer
from the circumstantial evidence in view of the
fact that there was in this case no direct or certain proof of the defendant's actual purpose.
(359 N.E. 2d at 1360)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held criminal
trespass to be a leser included offense of burglary in
construing statutes

akin

to

those found in Utah.

wealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975).

Common-

7

Undeniably, criminal trespass, as described in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) is a lesser included offense
to the burglary provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, Utah
Code Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-203, 76-6-204 (1953 as amended).
POINT C
WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.
Because criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of
burglary under Utah's statutes, the issue that now-must be
addressed is "when must the trial court instruct the jury on
such a lesser included offense?"

7. Pennsylvania's statutes like Utah's appear to be a result
of the Model Penal Code. Accord: State v. Coffin, 565
P.2d 391 (Ore. 1977).
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The issue raised in the instant case has been before this
court on numerous occasions in the past and has, on occasion,
brought differing views from the members of this court.
The need that such an instruction be given has been ruled
to be a statuttory requirement.

The statute in force at the

t~

of the appellant's trial is found in Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6
(1953 as amended), which states:
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense
the commission of which is necessarily included
in that with which he is charged in the indictment
or information, or of an attempt to commit the
offense.
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature in
the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4) which
provides:
The court shall not be obligated to charge
the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense. [Emphasis Supplied]
The foregoing provision, as this court has noted,
codifies prior existing common law principles dating back
to territorial times in Utah.

People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101,

21 P.403 (1889); State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978).
In State v. Barkas,

this

91 Utah 5 74, 65 P. 2d 1130 (1937),

court noted that the failure to give

on lesser included offenses when requested

an

instruction
. . clashes

with two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases:

It

has the effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effec:
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limiting the jury to a consideration of only part of the evidence (the defendants'): and it, in effect, casts upon
the accused the burden of proving his innocence or justification."
(65 P.2d at 1132).
When the accused requests a lesser included instruction
there should exist a presumption that the requested instruction
be given.

8

Such is the tenor of this court's discussions

in the past.

In State v. Hymas, 64 U.285, 230 P.

349 (1924)'

it was stated:
It is, however, always a delicate matter for
a trial court to withhold from the ju~y the
right to find the accused guilty of a
lesser or included offense, and determine
the question of the state of the evidence
as matter of law. That should be done only
in very clear cases.
(64 U.2 at 287) Accord:
State v. Barkas, 91 U.574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937).

8. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v.
Gillian supra, 23 U.2d at 376 wherein it is said:
The usual rule on an appeal in which
the challenge is to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict,
is that we review the record in the light
favorable to the jury's verdict. However,
in this situation where the question
raised relates to the refusal to submit
included offenses, it is our duty to survey
the whole evidence and the inferences
naturally to be deduced therefrom t~ see
whether there is any reasonable basis
therein which would support a conviction
of the lesser offenses.
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In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included
offense when requested.
The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a
lesser includeci offense was described in State v. Dougherty,
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976).

This court cited Lisby v. State,

83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed provision
similar to Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953).
holdi~g

Describing the

of the Nevada Court this courtsaid:
The Court discussed three situations in which
the problem of lesser included offenses are
frequently encountered. First, where there
is evidence which would absolve the defendant
from guilt of a greater offense, or degree, but
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser
offense, or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support
a finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser
offense or degree. For example, the defendant
denies any complicity in the crime charged,
and thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict; or where the elements of the
offenses differ, and some element essential to the
lesser offense is either not proved or shown
not to exist. This second situation renders an
instruction on a lesser included offense
erroneous, because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where
the elements of the greater offense include all eleme·
of the lesser offense; because, by its very
nature, the greater offense could not have been
committed without defendant having the intent
in doing the acts which constitute the lesser
included offense.' In such a situation instructions
on the lesser included offense may be given, because all elements of the lesser offense have
:
been given. However, such an instruction may proper·
be refused if the prosecution has met its burden
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of proof on the greater offense, and there is
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense.
The court concluded by stating that if there be
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable
theory of the case under which the defendant
might be convicted of a lesser included
offense, the court must, if requested, give
9
an appropriate instruction. (550 P.2d at 176-177)
The question that arises then when lesser
instructions are requested is:
however slight, on any

was there

"

included
. any evidence,

reasonable theory under which the

defendant might be convicted of the lesser tand] included
offense.

of criminal trespass.

State v. Dougherty,

supra, at 177; State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977)
(Justice Wilkins, concurring).

If there was such evidence

then the instructions were properly requested and should have
been submitted to the jury for consideration.
In State v. Hendricks,596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), a
criminal trespass instruction was refused when the defendant
was charged with burglary and that ruling was upheld on appeal
because the court found that the evidence did not warrant
the instruction.

The defendant had raised the defense of

voluntary intoxication and testified that he entered the
building to search for friends.

He was found hiding in a

closet and typewriters had been moved to the point of entry.

5,

9. State v. Doughert
supra, has been followed in State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 133 , 1355 (Utah 1977), and State v.
Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977).

-33-
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In this case the appellant admitted that he was
present in Mr. Ball's apartment at Snowbird (T. 38-39).

He

was also identified by Mr. Ball as the individual who was
observed in the apartment (T. 19).

Mr. Ball had not given

the appellant authority to enter the apartment (T. 19), and
entry was apparently gained by cut ting the screen to a s lidir.;
door (T. 12).

The only evidence that could conceivably

explain the appellant's presence was that a wooden box had
been moved from a shelf at the head of the bed to the
center of Mr. Ball's waterbed (T. 18) and the statement
made by the appellant to Mr. Ball when Mr. Ball questioned
him about his presence.

The appellant stated that he was

"looking for a way out" and that he was staying upstairs
(T. 12-13).

The box, however, had not been opened and the

appellant did not have any property in his hands, nor was any
property missing.

Under these facts a reasonable theory was

that the appellant had entered the apartment for some reason
other than to commit a theft.
Appellant's actions in the instant case are similar
to those of the accused in Crawford v. State, 241 N .E. 2d
795 (Indiana 1968).

In Crawford the accused was found

hiding inside a building at an unusual hour.

The Indiana

Court in reversing his conviction for burglary noted that his
denial of intent to commit a theft was sufficient to raise an
issue as to such intent (241 N .E. 2d at 797).

Moreover, withe
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further evidence his mere unauthorized entry 10 into the building
containing articles which could easily be carried away was
insufficient in and of itself to prove the intent to
steal those articles.

(241 N.E. 2d at 798, DeBruler,

Judge concurring).
Several cases involving similar facts have required
that the charge of burglary be reduced to criminal trespass.

In State v. Rood, 462 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1969), the defend-

ant was seen

inside of a building with his hand on a

television set.

When the neighbor came to investigate the

defendant fled.

The court held that the State must prove

that the defendant had the intent to commit a specific crime
to sustain the charge of burglary and not just the intent to
do some undetermined thing at the time he was inside of the
builiing. Similarly, in State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 646,
500 P.2d 747 (Haw. 1972), the defendant was found in the
victim's hotel room, when asked what he was doing there the
defendant stated that it was his room and he then fled from the
hotel.

The court held that the mere fact that the entry was

forced or unlawful did not establish the requisite intent for

10. It has long been the rule in Utah that me~e pres~nce
where a crime is being committed is in and of itself insufficient upon which to base a conviction. State v. Helm,
563 P.2d 794, 797 (~tah 1977); State v. Gee, 28 U.Zd 96, 498
P.2d 662 (1972); and State v. Fertig, 120 U. 224, 233 P.2d
347 (1951).
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burglary.

The court then held that the evidence was insuf-

ficient to establish a prima facie case for burglary and the
charge should be reduced to criminal trespass.
When a court has erred by failing to give a requested
instruction the error is deemed to be prejudicial
"if the requested instruction had been given and the jury had
so considered the evidence, there is reasonable likelihood
that it may have some effect on the verdict rendered."
State v.

~itcheson,

560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

The

evidence offered in this case on the issue of intent was
all circumstantial.

It is quite reasonable for the jury

to infer from this evidence that the appellant had some
intent other than to commit a theft when he entered the apartsr
This is especially true when this court considers the holding
of the courts in State v. Rood, supra, and State v. Kahinu,
supra.

In light of those holdings there is not only a reason-

able likelihood that the verdict would have

been dif-

ferent had the jury been properly instructed, but that outcome
would have been a distinct possibility.

This is because the

jury would not have to be asked to acquit t,te appellant r,•ho
was in

:rr. Ball's apartment without permission to be there,

they could have found that he was guilty of the lesser
offense.
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CONCLUSION
The only element of the offense of burglary which
was at issue in the trial was the appellant's intent to
commit a theft.

The court committed prejudicial error by

refusing to allow counsel to question the arresting
officer about the appellant's hearsay statement in which
he denied that he had requisite intent.

This statement

was admissible under at least five of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule.

Likewise, the trial court committed

prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the
lesser and included offense of trespass.

Th~s

is because the only difference between burglary and criminal
trespass is the intent to conunit a theft.
DATED this

~~day

of October, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant
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